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Relational reasoning, or the ability to integrate multiple mental relations to arrive at a logical
conclusion, is a critical component of higher cognition. A bilateral brain network involv-
ing lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices has been consistently implicated in relational
reasoning. Some data suggest a preferential role for the left hemisphere in this form of
reasoning, whereas others suggest that the two hemispheres make important contribu-
tions. To test for a hemispheric asymmetry in relational reasoning, we made use of an old
technique known as visual half-field stimulus presentation to manipulate whether stimuli
were presented briefly to one hemisphere or the other. Across two experiments, 54 neu-
rologically healthy young adults performed a visuospatial transitive inference task. Pairs of
colored shapes were presented rapidly in either the left or right visual hemifield as par-
ticipants maintained central fixation, thereby isolating initial encoding to the contralateral
hemisphere. We observed a left-hemisphere advantage for encoding a series of ordered
visuospatial relations, but both hemispheres contributed equally to task performance when
the relations were presented out of order.To our knowledge, this is the first study to reveal
hemispheric differences in relational encoding in the intact brain.We discuss these findings
in the context of a rich literature on hemispheric asymmetries in cognition.
Keywords: reasoning, hemispheric specialization, deductive, transitive inference
INTRODUCTION
Relational reasoning is a cognitive process that requires the joint
consideration of relations in order to generate an inference to
support a conclusion. Although there is a wide range of theo-
retical models for relational reasoning (for review, see Goodwin
and Johnson-Laird, 2005; Knowlton et al., 2012), all of these
models present relational reasoning as a unitary system. How-
ever, work from neuropsychological and neuroimaging literatures
indicates that some cognitive functions may be supported by mul-
tiple, redundant systems in the brain (Roser and Gazzaniga, 2004;
Marinsek et al., 2014). Here, we sought to test whether one hemi-
sphere displays an advantage over the other during relational
encoding, or whether this function can be carried out equally well
by each hemisphere.
Hints of a possible left-hemisphere advantage in relational
reasoning have emerged over the course of a number of neu-
roimaging experiments (e.g., Goel and Dolan, 2004; Green et al.,
2006; Bunge et al., 2009; Wendelken et al., 2011). Importantly, sim-
ilar patterns have been observed for tasks involving either verbal
or non-linguistic/pictorial stimuli, suggesting that the observed
differences are not entirely stimulus-driven and do not completely
overlap with regions supporting language (Monti and Osherson,
2012). However, the conclusions we can draw from these fMRI
studies about lateralization of function are limited in several ways.
Namely, brain imaging provides correlational rather than causal
evidence, and results depend on the specific contrasts used as well
as the choice of statistical threshold. All of these factors can mask
whether both hemispheres are indicated as being involved in a par-
ticular task, and thus, any conclusions about localization should
converge with experimental findings using multiple approaches.
The neuropsychological literature also hints at possible hemi-
spheric differences in contributions to reasoning. Much of the
early work investigating differential hemispheric contributions
to cognitive function came from work on split-brain patients
(e.g., Sperry et al., 1969). These studies indicated an improved
ability for hypothesis testing during problem solving in the left
relative to the right hemisphere (LeDoux et al., 1977) and has
led to the idea of the left hemisphere being an “interpreter” of
events – i.e., the hemisphere with a major role of integrating
newly acquired perceived information with previously constructed
theories (Gazzaniga, 2000; Marinsek et al., 2014).
Following the seminal work of Gazzaniga et al. (1962) indicat-
ing how cognitive function differed in the two hemispheres fol-
lowing sectioning of the commissures, hemispheric asymmetries
in cognition have alternately been characterized as a dichotomy
between local and global (van Kleeck, 1989), categorical and coor-
dinate (Kosslyn, 1987; van der Ham et al., 2014), or serial and
parallel (e.g., Cohen, 1973) processes (for review, see Bradshaw
and Nettleton, 1981). In the present study, we did not set out to
evaluate these competing accounts of hemispheric specialization;
rather, we sought to characterize the contribution of each hemi-
sphere to performance of a relational reasoning task adapted from
one used in a prior fMRI study from our group (Wendelken and
Bunge, 2010).
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There is not a consistent pattern relating relational reasoning
ability to damage in a particular hemisphere. Neuropsychological
work on relational reasoning has demonstrated the necessity of
prefrontal and posterior parietal regions during transitive infer-
ence (Waltz et al., 1999; Krawczyk et al., 2008; Waechter et al.,
2012), analogical reasoning (Morrison et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al.,
2008), and matrix reasoning (Baldo et al., 2010; Woolgar et al.,
2010). Additionally, studies employing voxel-based lesion symp-
tom mapping to investigate relationships between patterns of
brain damage and resulting cognitive deficits in fluid intelligence
(Barbey et al., 2014) have suggested that damage to the right hemi-
sphere plays a more critical role. However, Baldo et al. (2010)
demonstrated that patients who have incurred strokes in the left
hemisphere have been shown to also have significant deficits in
a visuospatial relational reasoning task; therefore, more research
is needed to provide a better understanding of each hemisphere’s
role in relational reasoning.
We designed the current study to test the role of each hemi-
sphere in relational encoding through the use of a visual half-field
stimulus presentation procedure. This paradigm was originally
developed for use in split-brain patients, who have either minimal
or no connection between the two hemispheres (e.g., Gazzaniga
et al., 1962). Here, our participants were healthy adults whose
hemispheres are presumed to interact closely in the coordination
of task performance (Weissman and Banich, 2000). Nevertheless,
we sought to test for differences in response times and/or accu-
racy when relational information is initially encoded by the left or
the right hemisphere. This visual half-field stimulus presentation
procedure allowed us to test whether left and right hemispheres
differentially support relational encoding.
In the present study, we used a transitive inference task adapted
from an fMRI task that we have used previously (Wendelken
and Bunge, 2010). When reasoning using transitive inference, the
logical conclusion is deduced through transferring relational infer-
ences among terms expressed in the premises (e.g., if A>B and
B>C, then A must be greater than C). On this task, shown in
Figure 1, participants view a new set of relations on every trial
and are expected to integrate them in working memory. There
has been a rich literature on this form of reasoning (e.g., Hal-
ford, 1984; Cohen et al., 1997; Andrews and Halford, 1998; Greene
et al., 2001). Importantly, this form of relational reasoning bears
only a passing resemblance to transitive inference paradigms that
involve learning paired associations over many trials (e.g., Acuna
et al., 2002; Zalesak and Heckers, 2009; Koscik and Tranel, 2012;
for discussion, see Wendelken and Bunge, 2010). The major differ-
ence between our transitive inference paradigm and those based
on learning paired associations is that our task does not rely on
remembering associations to be transferred; instead, participants
must infer the spatial relationship based on the relations from the
most recent trial only. Having to perform this inference anew each
trial reduces any tendency to assume an object-order relationship
when attempting to solve the task.
Inspired by neuropsychological research demonstrating that
prefrontal patients have difficulty with transitive inference when
the relations are presented out of order (e.g., “Sam is taller
than Roy,” “James is taller than Sam”; Waltz et al., 1999;
FIGURE 1 | Example trial from Study 2 (including the visual mask).
Participants were shown three pairs of colored shapes. Following each pair,
participants were shown a visual mask overlaying the previous shapes, and
then a fixation cross. After the third pair was presented in a given trial,
participants had up to 10 s to decide the correct linear order of two shapes
based on the spatial relationships observed among the pairs. This is an
example of a reordered trial, in which participants would presumably have to
manipulate their memory of the pairs in order to deduce that the square goes
on top of the pentagon. Study 1 was similar in design except for the absence
of the visual mask presentations.
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Krawczyk et al., 2008), we manipulated the sequence of presen-
tation of the three relations. On half of the trials, the relations
were ordered (A>B; B>C; C>D), and on the other half, they
were reordered (A>B; C>D; B>C or C>D, A>B, B>C). We
hypothesized that manipulating encoding in this manner would
have an influence on the downstream integration process, and
sought to test for hemispheric differences in performance on tri-
als whose relations could be integrated readily (ordered trials) and
those that could not (reordered trials).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Experiment 1: Twenty-three healthy adults (14 female, aged
18–34 years; X¯ ± SD age, 22±3.08 years). Experiment 2: Thirty-
one healthy adults (24 female, aged 18–25 years; X¯ ± SD age,
20±1.80 years). All participants attended the University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley, and participated in either Experiment 1 or 2
for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed,
and were fluent in English. Participants had no reported his-
tory of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All participants gave
their informed consent to participate in the study, which was
approved by the Committee for Protection of Human Subjects
at the University of California, Berkeley.
DESIGN
We ran two studies with a similar design except for the addition
of brief visual masks immediately following presentation of each
object pair (100 ms) and an additional 48 trials, both of which were
implemented in Experiment 2. We chose to insert the visual masks
in Experiment 2 to reduce any after-image perceptual influences
on decision making, in effect making the participant’s deduction
solely based on information stored and manipulated in working
memory (Kim and Blake, 2005). The task designs were identical
with the exception of these additions in Experiment 2; therefore,
all of the information below applied to both studies unless explic-
itly stated. The stimulus set consisted of four colored shapes: blue
triangle, orange circle, green pentagon, and pink square. On each
trial, three sets of relations – pairs of shapes arranged vertically,
with one colored shape positioned directly above another col-
ored shape – were presented in sequence (Figure 1). One-third of
the transitive inference trials involved ordered problems, in which
the source relations were presented in order (e.g., A>B, B>C,
C>D; A – D?); the other two-thirds involved reordered problems,
in which the middle relation was presented last (e.g., A>B, C>D,
B>C; A – D? or C>D, A>B, B>C; A – D?). Placing the middle
relation last instead of the final relation of the sequence assured
that participants could not rely on simple memory for the most
recent pair when making their decision.
Prior to the onset of each trial, white arrows appeared coming
from the four corners of the screen for 400 ms in order to direct eye
gaze to the center of the screen. Trials began with a white central
fixation cross displayed on screen for 50 ms. Each pair of shapes
was presented in the left or right visual hemifield for 200 ms, fol-
lowed by a visual mask for 100 ms (Experiment 2 only) and a
central fixation inter-stimulus interval (ISI) for 50 ms, and then
a different pair of shapes in either the same or opposite visual
hemifield for 200 ms. After being shown three pairs individually,
participants were asked to deduce the correct linear order of two
items (e.g., square and pentagon) based on the spatial relations
presented in the sequence of object pairs (e.g., square above trian-
gle, triangle above circle, and circle above pentagon). Participants
had≤10 s to make their decision regarding the correct linear order
of two colored shapes (i.e., which of the two objects would be on
top following the spatial relations represented in the trial).
PROCEDURE
Participants placed their heads in a chinrest affixed at arm’s length
from the screen, and were instructed to maintain their gaze on
a central fixation cross. Vertical pairs of shapes were displayed
between 4° and 6° of visual angle from central fixation (Buschman
et al., 2011).
In Experiment 1, the task included 96 trials total: 24 in which
all three shape pairs were presented to the left hemisphere (LLL),
24 in which they were presented to the right hemisphere (RRR),
24 in which they were presented to alternating hemispheres (12
LRL and 12 RLR trials), and 24 in which they were presented to
opposite hemispheres but did not alternate (12 LRR and 12 RLL
trials). The LRL, RLR, LRR, and RLL trials were inserted so that
participants could not reliably predict where the second and third
pairs would be presented. Experiment 2 included an additional 48
trials, but the balance of trial types was consistent with Experiment
1. Trials were evenly counterbalanced by hemispheric presentation
and ordering condition, and the trial order was fully randomized.
The final prompt displayed two shapes next to each other and
participants were instructed to indicate via key press which shape
should “go on top” based on the information in the three pairs of
relations. The “z” key corresponded to the shape on the left and
the “?/” key to the shape on the right; participants were instructed
to keep their left hand on the “z” key and right hand on the “?/”
key throughout the trials. In half the trials, the correct answer
appeared on the left and half on the right. Participants were given
a short break at the mid-point of the task. Experiment 2 contained
a third block of trials, so participants were given a second break.
RESULTS
FULLY LATERALIZED TRIALS
We first investigated whether the small differences in task design
between Experiments 1 and 2 would lead to any reliable differ-
ences in the results. A three-way mixed effects analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with experiment number as the between-subjects vari-
able, and hemispheric presentation (LH versus RH) and ordering
condition (ordered versus reordered) as within-subjects variables
indicated neither a main effect of experiment nor any interac-
tion with other factors, F’s< 1, p’s> 0.54. Thus, all subsequent
reported effects were generated from models collapsing across
studies1. We analyzed accuracy and response time data in sep-
arate two-way repeated measures ANOVAs, with hemispheric
1Including gender as a factor in the full model, we found that the males in this
study were more accurate than the females. Given the large gender imbalance in
our relatively small sample, this result should not be over-interpreted. Notably, both
males and females exhibited higher accuracy when the relations were presented to
the left hemisphere than to the right hemisphere.
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presentation and ordering condition as within-subjects factors.
In this first section, we discuss only those trials that were solely
presented to the left or right hemisphere. Behavioral results are
presented in Figure 2.
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of hemisphere
on accuracy, F(1, 53)= 27.15, MSE = 0.012, p< 0.01, η2partial =
0.34, such that participants performed better when relational
information in the reasoning problem was initially encoded by
the left hemisphere (X¯= 0.76, SD= 0.17) as compared to the
right hemisphere (X¯= 0.68, SD= 0.16). A significant interaction
between hemispheric presentation and ordering condition was
also observed, F(1, 53)= 8.2, MSE = 0.013, p< 0.01, η2partial =
0.13. Post hoc t -tests using Bonferroni correction showed that
participants were significantly more accurate when ordered pairs
were presented to the left hemisphere (X¯= 0.79, SD= 0.19)
as compared to the right hemisphere (X¯= 0.66, SD= 0.16),
t (53)= 6.02, p< 0.001, η2partial = 0.41. By contrast, no significant
differences were found in accuracy between the left hemisphere
(X¯ = 0.74,SD= 0.17) and right hemisphere (X¯ = 0.70,SD= 0.19)
on reordered trials, t (53)= 1.51, p> 0.13, η2partial = 0.04. We
could also describe this interaction by looking at differences
between trial types within each hemisphere. Although neither
of these comparisons passed Bonferroni correction, in the left
hemisphere, performance on ordered trials was better than on
reordered trials, whereas the opposite was true in the right hemi-
sphere. These results suggest that, although performance was best
when stimuli were presented in order to the left hemisphere, both
hemispheres performed similarly when relations were not pre-
sented in an order that is conducive to integration before solving
the transitive inference problem.
When including response times from correctly performed
trials as the dependent variable, the ANOVA produced a
marginally significant effect of hemispheric presentation, such
that participants were faster to produce the correct deci-
sion on trials that were presented to the left hemisphere
(X¯= 1218.41, SD= 433.56) as compared to the right hemisphere
(X¯= 1273.10, SD= 448.26), F(1, 53)= 3.93, MSE = 41115.21,
p= 0.053, η2partial = 0.07. No other effects in relation to response
time were found to be statistically significant,F’s< 1.26,p’s> 0.26.
These results suggest that the left-hemisphere boost in perfor-
mance was not due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff; rather, when
object pairs were presented to the left hemisphere, participants
tended to respond faster than they would have if information had
been presented to the right hemisphere.
ALL TRIALS
In this section, we describe analyses investigating perfor-
mance across both fully lateralized and mixed hemisphere trials
(Figure 3). We ran 4× 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with num-
ber of times in the left hemisphere (0, 1, 2, 3) and order (ordered
versus reordered) as within-subject factors, predicting accuracy
and response time scores in separate models.
No significant effects were found for response times, F’s< 1.8,
p’s> 0.18. In terms of accuracy, we found a significant main
effect of number of times in the left hemisphere, F(3,159)= 8.79,
MSE = 0.013, p< 0.001, η2partial = 0.14, such that greater accu-
racy was observed the more often premises were presented in the
left hemisphere. We also observed a trend for the effect of order,
such that accuracy on ordered trials (X¯= 0.74, SD= 0.16) was
marginally higher than on reordered trials (X¯= 0.72, SD= 0.15),
F(1,53)= 3.45, MSE = 0.017, p< 0.07, η2partial = 0.06. We
observed a significant interaction between number of times in
the left hemisphere by order, F(3, 159)= 5.55, MSE = 0.013,
p< 0.001, η2partial = 0.1. We found that for ordered trials there
was a significant monotonic increase in accuracy as premises were
presented to the left hemisphere, F(1, 53)= 38.11, MSE = 0.011,
FIGURE 2 | (A) Average proportion correct as a function of hemisphere
and ordering condition. A significant interaction was found such that
when pairs of objects were presented in order, performance was
significantly better when information was initially presented to the left
versus the right hemisphere. However, no reliable difference was
observed between hemispheres when pairs needed to be reordered in
memory. Additionally, an overall main effect was found indicating that
accuracy improved when pairs were initially encoded by the left
hemisphere as opposed to the right hemisphere. (B) Average response
time in milliseconds as a function of hemisphere and ordering condition,
for correct trials. No reliable differences were observed for response
time. **p<0.01.
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FIGURE 3 | Accuracy as a function of ordering condition and number of
times premise was presented in the left hemisphere (0, 1, 2, 3). For
ordered trials, accuracy increased monotonically with the number of times
a premise was presented in the left hemisphere. For reordered trials, a
simple pattern was not observed; rather, accuracy decreased when
premises were presented in the left hemisphere two times (i.e., on LRL
and RLL trials) relative to one or three times. No effects were observed for
response times.
p< 0.001,η2partial = 0.42. For reordered trials, no such linear trend
was observed,F(1, 53)< 1,p> 0.5. These results suggest that when
information is already ordered, increases in accuracy can be sig-
nificantly predicted by how many times the premises are presented
in the left hemisphere, and support our finding that participants
performed better when ordered trials were presented only to the
left hemisphere than to the right.
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES
In testing for hemispheric differences in performance on this tran-
sitive inference task, we sought to ensure that participants were
performing this task in the manner expected. When three rela-
tions are presented in order, it is possible to produce the correct
response even without integrating multiple relations (Bryant and
Trabasso, 1971). In our design, this simpler, non-integrative strat-
egy could be undertaken by paying attention only to the top item in
the first premise rather than encoding all premises and integrating
the relations between them. If participants were to take this strat-
egy, they would be expected to achieve roughly 100% accuracy on
ordered trials, but only around 50% accuracy on reordered trials
(because the first item of the first premise only appeared in the
final prompt on two-thirds of the trials). Six out of 54 partici-
pants exhibited a pattern consistent with the use of this strategy.
The findings reported here hold even when excluding these six
participants.
DISCUSSION
Inspired by findings from the neuroimaging and neuropsy-
chological literatures, we tested whether healthy young adults’
performance on a reasoning task would differ on whether the stim-
uli were presented to the left or right hemisphere. By designing a
transitive inference task with visual half-field stimulus presenta-
tion, we were able to show differences in reasoning performance
as a function of the hemisphere that initially encoded the sets of
visuospatial relations. Given that the two hemispheres commu-
nicate freely in the intact brain, we had expected only modest
differences in response times for left- versus right-hemifield stim-
ulus presentation. As such, we were surprised by the magnitude
of the behavioral difference elicited by visual half-field presen-
tation in this study, with an average difference in accuracy of
11% between left-lateralized and right-lateralized ordered trials.
Although claims of inter-hemispheric differences in cognition
have been made for many years (Gazzaniga et al., 1962; Cohen,
1973), our study is the first to demonstrate hemispheric differences
in relational encoding in neurologically intact participants.
Although task performance (i.e., accuracy) improved overall
when participants encoded the visuospatial relations in the left
hemisphere, this effect was driven by performance on the ordered
trials. That is, we observed a left-hemisphere advantage when the
relations were ordered linearly and, therefore, could be integrated
directly, but not when it was necessary to rearrange the relations
before integrating them. For right-hemisphere trials, participants
did not show the predicted pattern of worse performance for
reordered versus ordered trials. This pattern was unexpected, and
warrants further investigation. Surprisingly, given that reordered
trials are hypothesized to require additional processing relative
to ordered trials (Waltz et al., 1999; Krawczyk et al., 2008), left-
hemisphere encoding of reordered relations was superior even
to right-hemisphere encoding of ordered relations. These results
suggest that the left hemisphere excels at relational encoding.
The present results fit well with neuroimaging studies that have
pointed toward a left-hemisphere specialization in relational rea-
soning (Wendelken et al., 2008; Bunge et al., 2009; Green et al.,
2010). In light of these findings, it is interesting to consider a
recent resting-state functional connectivity study showing that the
left-hemisphere interacts more exclusively with itself, whereas the
right hemisphere demonstrates connectivity patterns associated
with both hemispheres (Gotts et al., 2013). This result suggests
that the left hemisphere may operate independently, whereas the
right hemisphere functions, at least partly, with assistance from
the left hemisphere. Given these findings, we would predict a
left-hemisphere advantage if relational encoding hinges more on
intra-hemispheric interactions, and indeed this prediction was
supported by our analysis including the mixed trials.
A LEFT-HEMISPHERE ADVANTAGE FOR RELATIONAL ENCODING
The behavioral improvement observed in our study does not indi-
cate that the right hemisphere cannot encode relational informa-
tion, but rather suggests that relational encoding may be processed
more effectively in the left hemisphere. Although the stimuli were
visuospatial in nature, they nonetheless were easily identifiable ver-
bally (e.g., circle, square, pentagon). Given how quickly premises
were presented, it does not seem feasible that very many partici-
pants would have had enough time to verbally label objects while
they solved the task; however, we cannot conclusively rule out this
possibility. The present study establishes a paradigm that could be
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used for further examination of the necessity of verbal labeling for
relational reasoning.
Numerous dichotomies have been used to explain hemispheric
asymmetries in cognitive functioning (Bradshaw and Nettleton,
1981), and so we do not claim that the left-hemisphere advan-
tage observed in our study is unique to relational encoding, per se.
Beyond the verbal/non-verbal distinction (Gazzaniga et al., 1962),
other theories have focused on local versus global (van Kleeck,
1989), serial versus parallel (Cohen, 1973), holistic versus ana-
lytic (Nebes, 1978; Cooper and Wojan, 2000), categorical versus
coordinate (Kosslyn, 1987), or syntactical versus intuitive/“gist”
(Bogen, 1975; Phelps and Gazzaniga, 1992) processing, to name a
few. Such dichotomies are useful in that they demonstrate how a
higher level cognitive task such as reasoning might be represented
as a combination of lower order cognitive processes. Our transi-
tive inference task could be construed as being syntactical, serial,
and analytic, and previous work focusing on these distinctions has
consistently demonstrated a left-hemispheric specialization (for
review, see Bradshaw and Nettleton, 1981). Additionally, encod-
ing spatial relations in the premises categorically (e.g., identifying
the square as above the triangle) would also fit with previous
work demonstrating a left-hemispheric advantage for categorical
encoding of spatial relations (Kosslyn, 1987; van der Ham et al.,
2012).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our results shed light on cognitive theories of relational reasoning,
as they provide evidence for differential processing of relations by
the two hemispheres. Specifically, we found that participants per-
formed better on our transitive inference task when the premises
were presented to the left hemisphere. This effect was driven by an
interaction such that there was a greater difference in performance
when the premises were ordered than when participants presum-
ably had to reorder the premises before making their conclusion.
Theories describing a unitary mechanism of relational reasoning
(e.g., Hummel and Holyoak, 2003; Goodwin and Johnson-Laird,
2005) may need to incorporate multiple components in order to
fully represent interhemispheric differences used during relational
reasoning.
The present results are consistent with theoretical predic-
tions concerning hemispheric specialization of cognitive func-
tions. Specifically, participants are expected to perform better
when information is presented to the left hemisphere for tasks
that could be solved using a stepwise and analytical strategy. Our
findings extend previous work given that our transitive inference
task not only exemplifies these types of strategies but also relies
on the comparison of relational information between premises in
order to arrive at a solution.
These behavioral results warrant further investigation with
neuroscientific techniques. First, functional imaging techniques
could be used to measure the dynamic interplay between hemi-
spheres during performance of this lateralized transitive inference
task. Second, transcranial direct current stimulation could be used
to increase or reduce cortical excitability within a hemisphere and
test whether relational reasoning performance in each hemisphere
changes as a function of cortical excitability (Nitsche and Paulus,
2001; Ardolino et al., 2005). Finally, patients with unilateral brain
injuries could be tested on this lateralized task to assess whether
relational encoding is primarily a left-hemisphere function, or
whether the right hemisphere could specialize in this function after
left-hemisphere damage. Thus, reapplying this well-established
stimulus presentation procedure in these multiple contexts will
help us to better understand the underlying mechanisms required
for processing relational information during reasoning.
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